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Abstract 
Access to finance is seen as a binding constraint on the growth of household enterprises in 
developing countries. We develop a principal-agent model of a household enterprise and 
show that limited access to finance and monitoring costs constrain the firm size via both  a 
direct and indirect effect. While greater access to finance has a positive direct effect on the 
hiring of paid labour, firms may not choose to expand and use paid labour, via an indirect 
route which operates through the monitoring costs of employing paid workers. We use large 
nationally representative surveys of household enterprises in Indian manufacturing and find 
support for the predictions of our theory. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An important stylized fact in low income countries is the presence of a large number of very 
small household enterprises in the informal sector which mostly employ family labour. Such 
firms rarely make the transition to the formal sector or grow in size by hiring labour from the 
outside market (Gollin, 2008; Woodruff, 2012).1 The presence of such a large number of 
micro sized household enterprises in developing countries along with their lack of growth is 
often attributed to credit constraints that do not allow these firms to increase in size (Hurst 
and Lusardi, 2004). For example, in the case of Vietnam, Rand (2007) shows that between 14 
per cent and 25 per cent of enterprises are credit constrained. Similarly, Banerjee and Duflo 
(2008) and Paulson and Townsend (2004) also find the presence of credit constraints among 
small firms in India and Thailand. However, for very small owner-managed enterprises, rates 
of return to capital can greatly exceed borrowing costs (de Mel et al., 2008; Cotler and 
Woodruff, 2008), and the relatively small amount of external funds that they require to grow 
may not be difficult to obtain from friends, family and business partners. Therefore, while 
credit constraints play an important role in determining the size of a firm, they cannot be the 
full explanation of why household enterprises in low income countries do not grow in size, 
and why owner-entrepreneurs do not become employers of wage labourers.2 
In this paper, we argue that the frictions in labour market in the form of monitoring costs of 
employing non-family labour exacerbates the problems of credit constraints and create 
obstacles for a small firm to grow in size. We show that the frictions stemming from 
supervision of labour may divert precious entrepreneurial time away from more productive 
tasks like product innovation or service delivery to monitoring of a worker’s activities. This 
leads to higher probability of failures of projects and increased wage costs of hired labour, 
thereby hindering the growth of family based firms. 
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The basic tenet of our argument is as follows: much of the entrepreneurial activities for the 
self-employed involve performing and coordinating multiple tasks. A successful 
entrepreneur, at least in the in the initial stages of the venture, gets involved in the 
development, design and marketing of the product as well as in the actual process of 
production.3 These tasks become relatively easier when the unit itself is in the beginning 
stage when all stakeholders are family members. However, when the production unit starts 
expanding its operation, an entrepreneur needs to hire outside workers and secure finance 
beyond family ties (King and Levine, 1993a, 1993b). However, approaching both labour 
markets for recruiting workers and credit markets to secure funds simultaneously for 
financing wage bills and related costs could expose an entrepreneur to agency problems from 
dual sources. The banks or creditors may ration credit to a new firm run by an entrepreneur 
due to lack of information or track record about the project.  On the other hand, an 
entrepreneur may face problems as labour recruited from an anonymous labour market may 
shirk, which may force the entrepreneur to divert time from productive activities to 
monitoring of workers. In addition, a larger incentive payment to incentivize outside workers 
tends to raise costs of recruitment and further tightens the credit constraints.4   
Set in the context of such dual constraints originating from credit and labour markets, the 
paper addresses the following sets of questions: (a) how do financing constraints in the credit 
market and, costs of monitoring workers hired from the labour market affect the allocation of 
entrepreneur’s time between productive activities and monitoring of non-family labour? (b) 
What is their joint impact on the size of the firm measured by the hiring of magnitude of non-
family labour? In particular, to what extent do monitoring costs of outside workers constrain 
entrepreneurship in low income countries and the growth of household enterprises which also 
encounter rationing of credit?      
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First, we show that both monitoring costs and credit constraints unambiguously reduce the 
number of hired labour compared to the benchmark case where both frictions are absent. The 
same circumstances also reduce entrepreneurial time devoted to productive activities leading 
to more frequent failures of projects. More surprisingly, our model predicts that even with 
relaxation of credit constraint and greater access to finance, the firm may not hire more 
outside labour if the relative magnitude of the frictions in the labour market tends to be larger 
than the frictions emanating from the credit market and this may inhibit the growth of the 
firm.  We show that whether the relaxation of the credit constraint would lead to an increase 
in the size of the firm would depend on the relative magnitudes of the productivity gains of 
hiring outside workers versus the higher monitoring costs of outside workers. We show that 
greater access to external finance has a positive direct effect on the hiring of paid labour. 
However, firms may not choose to expand and use outside workers, even with the relaxation 
of credit constraints via the indirect route which operates through the increased monitoring 
costs of employing paid workers. 
We then use an unique data-set comprising large nationally representative surveys of small 
and micro-enterprises in Indian manufacturing which provides information on the use of 
hired and family labour and relevant firm characteristics for 2000-01 and 2005-06 and 
explore whether our argument on the importance of monitoring costs in influencing the 
relationship between the easing of credit constraints and the firm’s demand for outside labour 
usage finds empirical support by pooling the data for these two years. We find evidence of a 
possible non-monotonic relationship between the firm’s magnitude of borrowing and the 
hiring of non-family labour, and show that this relationship depends negatively on the inverse 
of productivity and on the wage premium of non-family workers (that is, what the firm pays 
to the worker over and above the reservation wage). 
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The remainder of the paper is in four parts. In the next section, we develop our theoretical 
model. Section III proposes the empirical specification, discusses the econometric 
methodology and describes the data. In Section IV, we provide some descriptive statistics and 
discuss the econometric results. Section V concludes. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
Consider an entrepreneur who has a project which generates an uncertain outcome and the 
probability of success of the project depends on the amount of time devoted by the 
entrepreneur to tasks specific to prevent its failures.  Let λ be the time allocated by an 
entrepreneur towards marketing, designing or setting quality standards of the product or 
anything that boosts directly the probability of success of the project. We denote μ to be the 
time devoted to monitoring of hired labour from outside market. That is, once the design of 
the product is completed and is successful to some degree, the actual production, if carried 
out by the hired worker, needs supervision and monitoring and is captured by μ such that μ ≡
1 − λ. 
If 𝑝(𝜆) is the probability of success of the project, we assume that p/(λ) > 0 and p//(λ) ≤
 0. Let 𝑓(𝑛) be the firm’s production function that depends only on labour  (n).  If the firm 
uses labourers exclusively from the family, then one can regard the number to be fixed in 
size, and without any loss of generality, we can assume that n is equivalent to the number of 
paid non-family workers.5 We assume that the labour belonging to the family of the 
entrepreneur is motivated and need not require any monitoring of their activities. However, if 
the firm hires labour from the outside labour market, then entrepreneur must engage in 
monitoring.6    
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The cash strapped entrepreneur in household enterprises needs to borrow from the credit 
market in order to pay the wage bill so that the total costs of borrowing is wage rate (w) times 
total employment (n).  
For the determination of the wage rate, we follow the efficiency wage model of Calvo and 
Wellisz (1978, 1979) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). A worker obtains a wage rate (w) from 
the employer if she does not shirk. Her net pay-off is the wage rate minus the disutility or 
costs (c) associated with work and are equal to  𝑤 − 𝑐 . If the worker decides to shirk, then 
there is a probability q that she may get caught and fired, in which case she obtains a 
reservation wage rate  ?̅? outside the firm. However, if the worker shirks, the probability is 1 
– q that she is not caught and thus earns the wage rate w, without incurring costs of work.  
The probability of being monitored and caught upon shirking is not exogenous but it depends 
on the amount of time that an entrepreneur devotes to this activity. Hence, q =
q(μ),  q/(μ) > 0. Since 𝜇 ≡ 1 − 𝜆 = the amount of time spent by the entrepreneur on 
monitoring activities, it follows that 𝑞/(𝜆) < 0. 
In equilibrium, the worker must be indifferent to the possibility of shirking and being fired 
and not shirking and being paid the wage rate, w, so that: 
q(μ)?̅?  + (1 − 𝑞(μ))𝑤 = 𝑤 − 𝑐      (1)  
By rearranging equation (1), we get the standard efficiency wage equation,    
w =
c
q(µ)
+ ?̅?   (2),  
which simply suggests that wage rate is equal to a premium 
𝑐
𝑞(𝜇)
, which is paid to prevent 
workers from shirking, over the reservation ( market) wage rate ?̅?. The equation (2) also 
indicates the trade-off between allocation of time between monitoring of outside labour and 
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productive activities that enhance success of the project. More time devoted to monitoring 
(𝜇)  increases the probability (𝑞(𝜇)) of apprehending the evasion of work and thus reduces 
the wage rate (𝑤) but also it reduces the probability of success 𝑝(𝜆) due to less available 
time for making the project successful as 𝜇 ≡ 1 − 𝜆. 
In order to show the role of credit constraints and monitoring costs in influencing the firm’s 
decision to hire outside labour, we first consider the benchmark case where there is no credit 
rationing and no monitoring costs. 
Benchmark Case: No Credit Rationing and No Monitoring Costs 
We assume that the entrepreneur borrows money to pay for her wage costs and since the total 
amount of borrowing is 𝐿 =  ?̅?𝑛, she needs to pay back  ?̅?𝑛(1 + 𝑟), where ?̅? = wage rate in 
the labour market in the absence of any monitoring costs, and r is the market interest rate.   
The expected profit of the entrepreneur is: 𝜋 = p(λ)[f(n) − ?̅?𝑛 (1 + 𝑟)] − 𝐹 and she 
chooses λ and n to maximize the profit. Here, F is the fixed cost of investment.  
The first order conditions are:  
p/(λ)[f(n) − ?̅?𝑛 (1 + 𝑟)] ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 f /(n) − ?̅? (1 + 𝑟) = 0                             (3) 
Since, 𝑝/(𝜆) > 0, the entrepreneur chooses 𝜆 = 1, and equation (3) determines both the 
optimal amount of labour and  also determines the total borrowing ?̅?𝑛(?̅?, 𝑟). 
Therefore, the entrepreneur chooses all of her time towards productive activities (λ = 1) so 
that the probability of success in her project is maximum and expected profit, [f(n) −
w̅n (1 + r)] is also maximum. 
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Introducing Credit rationing and Monitoring Costs:  
Now, suppose that firms are credit rationed and they also need to incur the monitoring costs 
in the form of paying a wage rate, 𝑤 =
𝑐
𝑞(𝜇)
+  ?̅?. The amount of loan is now fixed for the 
entrepreneur so that her budget constraint for hiring labour is 𝐿 + 𝑎 = 𝑤𝑛, where 𝑎 is the 
personal wealth or assets of the entrepreneur. Since the Left Hand Side (𝐿 + 𝑎) is fixed due to 
rationing of funds and limitations of personal wealth, she can hire more labour and increase 
production only by reducing the wage rate. This immediately generates the following trade-
off under the presence of monitoring costs and rationing of loans. If she spends more time in 
monitoring (by increasing 𝜇), the probability of detection of shirking increases (since 𝑞(𝜇) is 
an increasing function of 𝜇) and results in a decrease of the  wage rate  𝑤 =
𝑐
𝑞(𝜇)
+  ?̅?. 
Hence, output increases because she can hire more labour with her available funds which also 
increases her expected profit at the margin. But it also results in the decrease of time devoted 
to the project and the probability of success decreases, leading to a fall in the pay-off from 
engagement in entrepreneurial activities at the margin.   
It is also easy to see credit constraints will have an impact on the hiring of outside labour. If 
the amount of credit received by the firm L + a <  w̅n (w̅, r), the amount that firm procures 
without rationing, given the wage rate,  the optimal level of employment in a credit 
constrained firm is n < 𝑛 (w̅, r) so that f /(n) − w̅ (1 + r) > 0. That is, credit constraints 
prevent the entrepreneur to carry out production to the point where the expected surplus is 
also at maximum. 
To sum up the discussion regarding monitoring costs and credit constraint:  
(a) Monitoring cost takes the form of 𝑤 − ?̅? =
c
q(µ)
> 0 and (b) Rationing of credit 
implies that f /(n) − ?̅? (1 + 𝑟)>0.  
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We next show the trade-off for the entrepreneur in spending time on entrepreneurial activities 
and on monitoring outside workers.  
The entrepreneur’s expected profit in the presence of credit constraints and monitoring cost is 
given by:  
𝜋 = 𝑝(𝜆)[𝑓(𝑛) − 𝐿(1 + 𝑟)] − 𝐹                                     (4) 
Where, 𝑛 =
L+a
w
=   
𝐿+𝑎
𝑐
𝑞(µ)
+?̅?
 
Hence,  𝜋 = 𝑝(𝜆) [𝑓 (
𝐿+𝑎
𝑐
𝑞(𝜇)
+ ?̅?
) − 𝐿(1 + 𝑟)] – 𝐹                                                     (5) 
We define 𝑅 = 𝑤𝑛(1 + 𝑟) = the total principal and interest that needs to be paid to the bank. 
The entrepreneur chooses 𝜆, to maximize the expression and the first order condition is: 
𝜕𝛱
𝜕𝜆
= 0 => 𝑝/(𝜆)[𝑓(𝑛) − 𝑅] +  𝑝𝑓/(𝑛) 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜆
= 0                                                      (6) 
By plugging  
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜆
=
𝐿+𝑎
[
𝑐
𝑞(𝜇)
+?̅?]
2 
𝑐
𝑞
𝑞/
𝑞
= −𝑛
(𝑤−𝑤)̅̅ ̅̅
𝑤
𝑞/
𝑞
  into above expression, we get: 
𝑝/ (λ)[f(n) − R] =  p𝑓/(n)n
(𝑤−𝑤)̅̅ ̅̅
𝑤
𝑞/
𝑞
                              (7) 
Where 𝑞/(𝜇) > 0 and 𝜇 = 1 − 𝜆 
Equation (7) captures the tension of allocation of time between entrepreneurial activities 
because the Right Hand Side of the equation, p/ (λ)[f(n) − R], is the gains at the margin on 
entrepreneurial activities and the Left Hand Side of the equation is the costs of increased 
wages that results from less monitoring efforts at the margin (given by n
(w−w)̅̅ ̅̅
w
q/
q
) and the 
consequent loss of profit due to reductions in employment captured by the term pf /(n). 
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Immediately, it follows from the first order condition, we get 𝜆 < 1. That is, entrepreneurial 
activities suffer due to monitoring costs. 
We now capture the effect of a change in the financial variables, L and a, on the time spent 
on entrepreneurial activities, λ, and the hiring of outside labour, n, by the means of two 
propositions.  
Proposition 1: An increase in loans will increase the time devoted to entrepreneurial 
activities if the increase in profits resulting from greater time spent on entrepreneurial 
activities at the margin  (measured by 𝑓/(𝑛) − (1 + 𝑟)]  exceeds marginal monitoring costs  
(𝑛
(𝑤−𝑤)̅̅ ̅̅
𝑤
 
𝑞/
𝑞
) by a proportion, p/p/. 
Proof: The straightforward differentiation of (7) yields, 
 
∂λ
∂L
=
𝑝𝑓/(𝑛)𝑛
(𝑤−𝑤)̅̅ ̅̅
𝑤
 
𝑞/
𝑞
  −𝑝/(𝜆)[𝑓/(𝑛)−(1+𝑟)]
𝛱𝜆𝜆
1
𝑤
>< 0  according as 
[𝑓/(𝑛)−(1+𝑟)]
𝑓/(𝑛) 𝑛 
(𝑤−𝑤)̅̅ ̅̅
𝑤
 
𝑞/
𝑞
> (<)
𝑝
𝑝/
 
(𝜋𝜆𝜆 < 0 due to the second order condition of profit maximisation). 
Proposition 2: The effect of a relaxed credit constraint on the use of hired labour depends 
on three components: 
(a) The direct effect, that increases the demand for hired labour; 
(b)An indirect effect, via the increase in production with greater access to finance, that 
tends to increases the demand for hired labour (the credit rationing effect). 
(c) An indirect effect, via an increase in monitoring costs, which tends to reduce the 
demand for hired labour (the monitoring cost effect). 
Proof: Differentiating  𝑛 =
𝐿+𝑎
𝑐
𝑞(µ)
+?̅?
  with respect to 𝐿,  
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we get  
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝐿
=
(
𝑐
𝑞(µ)
+?̅?)−(𝐿+𝑎) 
𝐶
𝑞
𝑞/
𝑞
∂λ
∂L
[
𝑐
𝑞(𝜇)
+?̅?]
2 . 
The first term is the direct effect of increasing the size of loan and is positive. The second 
effect is given by  
𝜕𝜆
𝜕𝐿
, and captures the indirect effect of L or a on n, as shown in Proposition 
1. Its sign depends on the strength of two countervailing effects: the first, as given by 
statement (b) in Proposition 2, is the gains in profits due to the increased time that the 
entrepreneur can spend on entrepreneurial activities with the relaxation of the credit 
constraint. This effect is positive – that is, with an increase in L, the entrepreneur is able to 
increase the employment of outside labour, to increase production. We call it the credit 
rationing effect. The second, as given by statement (c) of Proposition 2, is the increase in the 
wage premium that the entrepreneur has to pay outside workers if she spends more time on 
entrepreneurial activities, leading to a fall in employment, for a given wage bill. We call it the 
monitoring cost effect.  
Proposition 2 makes clear that the effect of an easing of the credit constraint on the firm’s 
decision to employ outside labour usage is not necessarily positive, and could even be 
negative, if the monitoring cost effect is large enough to swamp the direct effect and the 
credit rationing effect. We see that whether the relationship between access to finance and the 
hiring of non-family labour is positive or negative would depend in part on whether gains in 
profits due to the easing of credit rationing is higher or lower than the increase in monitoring 
costs with the employment of such labour.  
Our model also suggests that monitoring costs would tend to be very large with an increase in 
the size of the firm, so that the demand for labour may increase with an increase in access to 
finance, and then decrease beyond a certain point. Thus, it is possible that the relationship 
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between hired labour employment (n) and loan amount (L) may be inverted U shaped, as 
shown in Figure 1. 
Propositions 1 and 2 together lead to the emergence of the following hypothesis that we plan 
to test with a unique data set in the next section. 
Hypothesis: While the direct effect of greater access to external finance on hired labour 
usage is expected to be positive, the indirect effect via greater monitoring costs can be 
negative. The indirect effect will depend positively on firm productivity (that is, negatively on 
the inverse of productivity) and negatively on the wage premium. 
‘FIGURE 1 HERE’ 
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY, ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Our main prediction is that the relationship between firm’s use of hired (non-family) labour 
and access to finance (as captured by the firm’s borrowing) is not necessarily positive and 
possibly non-monotonic. Whether this relationship is positive or not would depend on the 
relative strengths of two effects – the increase in the firm’s output (and consequently, 
profitability) with an increase in the time that the firm’s owner spends on entrepreneurship 
related activities and the increase in wage costs due to the less amount of time that the owner 
can spend on monitoring non-family workers when she spends more time on entrepreneurial 
activities. If the marginal gain to the firm that results from the increase in output with the 
hiring of more non-family workers is greater than the marginal cost originating from the 
higher wage costs, then the firm will increase hired labour usage to the point where marginal 
costs of wage premium offsets marginal gains from increased production. If the marginal 
costs of hiring more non-family workers outweigh the marginal benefit of hiring them, the 
firm may decrease the use of non-family labour, even with greater access to external finance. 
13 
 
Empirical Strategy 
To test for the possible non-monotonicity of the hired labour-access to finance relationship, 
we examine how this relationship depends on the two countervailing effects: the marginal 
gains of increasing the usage of hired labour, given by the expression: ))1()(( rnf   and 
the marginal costs of increasing the usage of hired labour, given by the expression: 
))((
q
q
w
ww 
. We capture the expression ))1()(( rnf   by the average productivity of the 
firm (since the rate of interest r will not differ across firms for a given year), and we 
approximate the expression: ))((
q
q
w
ww 
 by the firm-specific wage premium, where the 
wage premium = average wage rate of hired workers in the firm – reservation wage.7 We take 
the wage premium to be the average wage rate that the firm pays to its workers minus the 
government-determined minimum wage rate set in the state in which the firm is located, 
divided by the average wage. We then test for the possible non-monotonicity of the hired 
labour-access to finance relationship by running regressions of hired labour usage on total 
loans and introducing interaction terms of the following type: 
Interaction term (1) = LOAN × INVPROD 
Interaction term (2) = LOAN × WAGEPREM 
Where INVPROD is the inverse of labour productivity of the firm, and WAGEPREM is the 
difference between the average wage rate of hired workers in the firm minus the state-level 
minimum wage rate. 
Our hypothesis will be that both interaction terms will be negative and significant, if the 
relationship between hired labour usage and the firm’s borrowing is non-monotonic and 
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depended positively on firm productivity (that is, negatively on the inverse of productivity) 
and negatively on the wage premium. 
Therefore, we test for the presence of a possible non-monotonic effect of finance constraints 
on hired labour usage by running a regression of the following generic form: 
ℎ𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑗𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑗𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑗𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝑚>1 𝑍𝑡
𝐹 + ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝑛>1 𝑍𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑃 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑘>1 𝑍𝑡
𝐷 +
𝜃𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡            (8) 
where h is the number of hired non-family workers, the subscript j stands for firm, i stands 
for industry and t for time. We denote the firm’s access to finance by LOAN, which is the 
firm’s total borrowing. ZF, ZP and ZD are a set of control variables which we discuss later. 
Our unit of analysis is the firm, and we have data on the use of hired and family labour by 
firms in the Indian informal manufacturing sector from two cross-sectional surveys 
conducted by the Indian National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) for the entire country 
in 2000-01 and 2005-06.8 We have over 12, 000 firms in this pooled data-set, across 21 
industries, 429 districts and 15 Indian states.  
We hypothesise that α1 is positive while α4 and α5 are both negative.  
According to our theoretical model, the signs of PRODINV and WAGEPREM are ambiguous. 
PRODINV is the inverse of labour productivity, and a lower PRODINV would imply higher 
profits for the firm with greater productivity, leading to higher demand for hired workers. In 
our model, lower productivity is also a function of lower entrepreneurial time for activities 
that increase the productivity of the firm, and more time for the monitoring of outside labour. 
This would imply that there could be a positive relationship between PRODINV and hired 
labour usage. 
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Similarly, a higher WAGEPREM would imply higher wage costs for the firm, and therefore, 
lower demand for hired labour.  On the other hand, a higher wage premium would imply 
lower shirking by the worker, and thereby, higher productivity of the firm, increasing the 
demand for hired labour.  
There are three possible sources of omitted variable bias in the specification set out in 
equation (8). Firstly, the entrepreneur’s decision to keep the firm small (and not hire outside 
workers) even when it is possible to expand the size of the firm may not only be due to 
monitoring costs but also could be related to her desire not to increase firm size so as to avoid 
registering the firm with official agencies (which is compulsory in India, once the firm 
employs ten workers if using electricity, and 20 workers if not using electricity). In this case, 
the decision to formalise (and hence, make the firm grow) would be related to the costs of 
formalization – both fixed (entry costs such as costs of registering business) and recurring 
(paying taxes and complying with regulations) – relative to the returns to formalization 
(Fajnzylber et al. 2011, Ulyssea 2010, Taymaz 2009, Dabla-Norris et al. 2005). To 
incorporate the determinants of the decision to formalise, we have added a vector of control 
variables, 𝑍𝑡
𝐹 , that capture the costs and benefits of formalisation of units in the informal 
sector. In India, business regulations and costs of starting a business differ significantly 
across Indian states, and we use two state-specific variables to capture the costs of 
formalisation- days required to start a business (DAYSBUS), and taxes paid, as percentage of 
total profits (TAXRATE).9 In addition, a significant deterrent to formalisation in India are 
state specific labour laws, which come into operation for firms in the formal sector, and 
which prevent firms to fire workers on permanent contracts without going through a costly 
judicial process. We use the commonly used Besley-Burgess (2004) measure of labour 
regulation (LABREG).10 To capture the benefits of formalisation, we compute the difference 
in labour productivity between formal and informal sector for each Indian state 
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(LABPRDDIF) and use this variable as a proxy for the gain in profits that occur when firms 
move from the informal to the formal sector.  
A second source of omitted variable bias would be in our construction of the wage premium 
variable, which is the relative difference between the firm specific wage rate and the 
reservation wage, and which is our proxy measure of monitoring costs. However, such a 
measure would be the true measure of monitoring costs if all labour in the firm was 
homogenous. If the production process required hiring workers of varying skills, then the 
difference between the average wage rate and the state-level minimum wage across firms will 
reflect heterogeneity in production technologies rather than the monitoring costs.  In order to 
control for differences in production technologies across firms, we use a variety of firm-
specific variables that approximate for the nature of the firm-specific production function, 
and its technological characteristics.  
A third possible source of omitted variable bias is the innate ability of the entrepreneur, 
which would differ across firms – the ability of the entrepreneur has found to be a significant 
positive determinant of the firm’s ability to succeed (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2013), and 
therefore, can increase hired labour usage via higher profitability of the firm (we show in 
Appendix 1 that our model predicts that an increase in the ability of the entrepreneur 
unambiguously increases hired labour usage).  
𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑃  is a vector that includes firm-specific variables to control for the influence of production 
technology and ability of entrepreneur in informal firms on the firm’s decision to hire outside 
workers. To control for the influence of production technology, we use firm-specific 
variables that capture the location of the firm (LOCATION), the registration status of the firm 
(REGIS), whether the firm is in a sub-contracting relationship with another firm (LINKAGE), 
the ownership status of the firm (OWNERSHIP) and whether the firm operates through the 
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year or seasonally (NATOP). We provide the justification of these variables as proxies of 
production technology below. 
LOCATION: Firms located in and around cities and towns will have access to better 
infrastructure, and larger markets for skilled labour and raw materials and are more likely to 
have different production technologies that are more skilled labour intensive than firms 
located in rural areas. To control for the effects of a firm’s location on its production 
technology (in particular, in the mix of skilled and unskilled labour it employs), we introduce 
LOCATION as a control variable, which takes the value 1 if the firm is located in urban areas 
and 0 if they are located in rural areas.  
REGIS: Being a part of an act/authority could help the owner-manager to access and secure a 
range of financial and non-financial resources (information, knowledge, technology, and 
finance) that are otherwise mostly unavailable to the firms in the informal sector. Levenson 
and Maloney (1998) argue that registration of the firm with an authority grants legitimacy to 
the owners in terms of obtaining bank loans and access to legal systems, which are 
instrumental in fostering growth. This is also supported by a recent study by Sharma (2014) 
who finds that registration leads to a 32% gain in sales per employee and a 56% gain in value 
added per employee for firms in the small-scale sector in India. Therefore, firms registered 
under an act/authority are more likely to have more sophisticated production technologies 
than those firms which are not. We use registration status as a proxy for the firm’s production 
technology by constructing a variable, REGIS, which takes the value 1 if they have registered 
under any act and 0 if they did not.11  
LINKAGE: The NSSO in its surveys asks the firms whether they work solely for a contractor 
(that is, it sells all its output to the contractor, who usually in this tied arrangement supplies it 
with inputs). We name this variable LINKAGE and code it as 1 if they work for a contractor 
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and 0 if they do not. Firms that work for contractors are more likely to need workers with 
specialised skills as well as have access to better technology through the firms they work 
form than firms which do not work for contractors (Taymaz and Kilicaslan 2000; Yasuda 
2005; Giunta et al. 2012).  
OWNERSHIP: In the informal sector, there are two types of firms based on ownership: 
proprietary firms and partnership firms. Proprietary firms are those firms where an individual 
is the sole owner of the enterprise while partnership firms are owned by more than one 
individual who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any one of 
them acting for all (NSSO, 2002).  The ability to access a larger pool of entrepreneurial talent 
as well as to diversify risks among many owners differentiates partnership firms from 
proprietary firms, which suggest that the former set of firms are more likely to use more 
sophisticated and higher return technologies than the latter set of firms. We construct a 
variable OWNERSHIP that takes the value 1 if the firm is a partnership firm and 0 if the firm 
is owned by an individual, and use this variable as another measure of the firm’s production 
technology.  
NATOP: Some firms in the Indian informal sector operate throughout the year (we call these 
perennial firms) while others only operate for a few months of the year (we call seasonal 
firms). Perennial firms are more likely to invest in specialised capital and technology than 
seasonal firms as they face more stable and predictable demand than seasonal firms. 
Therefore, we include nature of operation (NATOP) as another measure of the firm’s 
production technology (the variable assumes a value 1 if the firm is a perennial firm and 0 
otherwise).  
To control for the manager’s innate ability, we do not have a direct measure of the 
entrepreneur’s ability such as the Peabody-Picture-Vocabulary Test of cognitive skills 
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(Krishnan and Krutikova, 2013). Instead, we use the maintenance of accounts by the 
entrepreneur (ACMAINT) as a proxy for ability – as Raj and Sen (2015) show, entrepreneurs 
that maintain accounts tend to see their firms grow in size. The variable ACMAINT takes the 
value 1 if the entrepreneur maintains an account, 0 if not. 
We also include controls on human capital, as previous studies on informal firm growth have 
shown that firms with more educated managers tend to grow faster (Mead and Liedholm 
1998; Van der Sluis et al. 2005; Akoten and Otsuka 2007; McPherson, 1996). In addition, the 
greater the supply of skilled workers in local labour markets, the more likely will the firm’s 
owner/manager be willing to hire outside workers. We do not have information on the 
educational level of the owner/manager in the NSSO data; instead we use data on primary 
and secondary school attainment for the district in which the informal firm is located (which 
we obtain from the 2001 Census of India). Thus, 𝑍𝑡
𝐷 represents the vector that includes 
district specific human capital variables – PRIMEDU and MIDGRADEDU. PRIMEDU 
captures the proportion of individuals who are educated at primary level or below and 
MIDGRADEDU stands for the proportion of individuals educated at secondary level and 
above.  
γi are industry specific fixed effects and δt is the year dummy (=1 if the survey is for 2005-
06). Since some industries are more reliant on external finance than others (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998), we include industry fixed effects as controls to capture industry-specific 
external finance requirements which may exert an independent influence on hired labour 
usage over and above that exerted by the finance constraint that the firm faces.12 Inclusion of 
the year dummy for 2005-06 as a control variable expects to capture macro shocks that may 
have positive productivity effects, leading to an increase in hired labour usage. All financial 
variables, firm size and number of hired workers (our dependent variable) are transformed to 
their natural logarithmic values.  
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Econometric Methodology 
To estimate equation (8), we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variable 
(IV) estimation methods, with robust standard errors clustered at the district level, to account 
for possible non-independence of the error term across districts. The data is pooled, 
comprising two cross-sections for 2000-01 and 2005-06.  
While we present OLS estimates of equation (8) in the paper, the use of OLS is problematic 
in that we are implicitly assuming that the LOAN variable that we include on the Right Hand 
Side is capturing finance constraints. However it is quite likely that LOAN may be demand 
determined and not supply determined – that is, as firms increase their hiring of outside 
labour, they increasingly borrow from external sources to pay for their wages. To address 
endogeneity concerns with LOAN, we employ instrumental variables (IV) methods, where we 
use two instrumental variables that capture the supply side of financial intermediation. First, 
we use a direct measure of the firm’s finance constraint, as has been used by Rand (2007). 
The NSSO asks the firms in its surveys if they have faced any constraint on its borrowing in 
the last year. We denote this variable BORRCN and code this variable equal to 1 if the firm 
states that it faced a constraint and 0 if it answers that it did not face a borrowing constraint. 
Second, we use the level of financial development in the district where the firm is located, as 
measured by bank credit per capita (credit amount outstanding divided by total population at 
the district level).13 We denote this variable BKCRDT. We believe that both BORRCN and 
BKCRDT will meet the necessary exclusion criterion as instrumental variables as they are not 
expected to influence the firm’s decision to hire outside workers except through the 
borrowing constraint that the firm faced. We test for the suitability of BORRCN and 
BKCRDT as instruments in the first stage regressions of the Two Stage Least Squares 
estimation method.  
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Data and Variables 
We use unit level data for the informal manufacturing sector for two years, 2000-01 and 
2005-06. Data on the informal manufacturing sector is drawn from the Government of India’s 
National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) surveys on the informal manufacturing sector, 
which is undertaken quinquennially using a stratified sampling procedure. The surveys 
contain information on the number of hired/outside labour as well as family labour for each 
firm. The surveys also provide information on total loans outstanding for the firm, and total 
fixed assets owned by the firm. All financial variables are deflated by the wholesale price 
index for capital goods. In our study, we consider only those firms that have completed at 
least three years since inception. Our data is in the form of repeated cross-sections, and not in 
panel form, as the NSSO does not reveal the identity of the firm/plant in the unit level data, 
and the same firms may not be surveyed in each round. The lack of availability of panel data 
is a limitation of our analysis.  
 
IV. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND RESULTS 
We begin the empirical analysis by presenting the summary statistics, and an exploratory 
graphical analysis of the possible non-monotonicity of the relationship between access to 
finance and hired labour usage.  We then present the main results of the econometric analysis. 
Descriptive Statistics 
We present summary statistics of the key variables used in the empirical analysis in Table 1. 
We see that the average number of hired labour per firm is 3.71 (exponential of 1.310), and 
54.7 per cent of the firms state that they face borrowing constraints.14  
‘TABLE 1 HERE’ 
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Results 
Table 2 presents the OLS estimates of equation (8).  In Cols. (1) and (2), we test for the two 
interaction effects separately, and in Col (3) we include both the interaction effects. We begin 
with a basic specification (with no industry or year dummies,  control variables for 
production technology, ability of entrepreneur and costs and benefits of formalisation and 
district specific control variables), where we regress the number of hired workers against 
loans, inverse productivity and wage premium and the interaction effects. The coefficient on 
loans is significant at the 1 per cent level and of the right sign – greater access to finance (as 
captured by a higher amount of loans taken by the firm) leads to a higher use of outside 
workers. In Cols. (1) and (2), the interaction terms LOAN*INVPROD and 
LOAN*WAGEPREM are negative as hypothesised, and statistically significant. When we 
introduce the interaction terms together in Col. (3), both the interaction terms 
LOAN*INVPROD and LOAN*WAGEPREM are negative and statistically significant at the 1 
per cent level.  In Cols. (4), we re-do the same specification as in col (3) with industry and 
year dummies included. We then introduce control variables for costs and benefits 
offormalisation, production technology and ability of entrepreneur in col (5). We bring in 
district specific controls in col (6). The coefficients retained the same sign and significance in 
these estimations too. Therefore, the OLS estimates provide clear evidence of a non-
monotonicity in the relationship between the firm’s hiring of non-family labour and firm’s 
total borrowing. For sufficiently low levels of firm productivity and/or sufficiently high 
levels of the wage premium, the firm may actually use less non-family labour, with greater 
borrowing. We also find that the coefficients on all the control variables have the right signs 
and are statistically significant (Table 4 in Appendix II). . 
Next, we address endogeneity concerns with LOAN – the positive relationship between 
LOAN and hired labour use may be driven by the fact that firms who use more outside labour 
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are more likely to borrow from external sources to pay for their wages. To address these 
concerns, we use Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with BORRCN and BKCRDT as an 
instrument for LOAN, and estimate the full specification - industry and year dummies, 
controls for costs and benefits of industrialisation, production technology and ability of 
entrepreneurs and district specific controls. We present the IV results in col. (7) and (8) of 
Table 2, with the first stage results and tests for the validity of the instrument presented in the 
lower panel of the Table. We find that both the interaction terms are negative and significant 
at the 1 per cent level for the IV estimations.  The first stage results show that BORRCN has a 
negative and significant relationship with LOAN while BKCRDT has a positive and 
significant relationship with LOAN. The various test statistics show that the IV procedure 
works well for our estimations. The instrument passes the test for weak instruments, implying 
it is strongly correlated with our finance variable. This is important since weak instruments 
can lead to severely biased estimates. Further, the Hansen J Statistic for overidentification is 
insignificant for all the models, confirming that the instrumental variable is indeed exogenous 
and correctly excluded from the performance equation. Thus, the IV results reinforce the 
main finding of the OLS estimates that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the 
firm’s employment of non-family labour and total borrowing.15 We also re-run our 
regressions using ASSET as an alternate measure of the firm’s financial constraint since our 
model is symmetric in its prediction of a non-monotonic relationship between use of non-
family labour and the total assets of the firm (denoted by a in our model). We find identical 
results for both OLS and IV estimates when we use ASSET instead of LOAN.16 
‘TABLE 2 HERE’ 
Finally, we test for one more prediction of our model – that the firm may try and decrease 
non-family labour once a certain threshold of firm size has been reached with greater access 
to finance as beyond a certain size of the firm, the monitoring costs of non-family labour may 
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exceed the benefit of greater economies of scale through a larger firm size.17 We introduce an 
interaction term FIRM SIZE*LOAN, and test for its sign and significance.  We call these 
regressions Auxiliary Regressions. We first estimate the basic regression with no industry 
and year dummies as controls and then including industry and year dummies.  We present the 
OLS and IV estimates in Table 3. We find clear and unequivocal non-monotonicity in the 
hired labour-loan relationship. That is, beyond a certain size of the firm, an increase in loans 
seems to lead to a decline in the use of non-family labour. Overall, our results suggest that 
monitoring costs of non-family labour play an important role in discouraging owner-managed 
firms to increase their size and to hire more non-family labour, and that the easing of credit 
constraints do not automatically lead to the growth of the firm. 
‘TABLE 3 HERE’ 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
For an owner-managed small firm, the hiring of a non-family worker is a non-trivial decision 
and involves a trade-off between the greater profits and productivity benefits that the firm can 
enjoy with a larger size and the opportunity cost of the firm’s owner in monitoring the 
worker’s effort and as a consequence, increasing wages of non-family workers to provide 
greater incentive for them to be productive. In this context, we show that the availability of 
external finance can have a perverse effect – while the direct effect of the easing of credit 
constraints will always be positive on the hiring of non-family labour, it is possible that if the 
increase in the wage premium to be paid to non-family workers is so high, or if the 
productivity benefits of the increase in size not large enough, the owner-manager may 
actually decrease the amount of non-family workers to spend more time on entrepreneurship 
activities. We develop a model that captures this trade-off and which shows that under certain 
conditions, greater access to external finance may actually lead to a fall in hired labour usage. 
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We then explore the empirical implications of our model using an unique data-set comprising 
large nationally representative surveys of small and micro-enterprises in Indian 
manufacturing which provides information on the use of hired and family labour and relevant 
firm characteristics for 2000-01 and 2005-06.  
We find evidence of a possible non-monotonic relationship between the firm’s borrowing and 
the hiring of non-family labour, and show that this relationship depends negatively on the 
inverse of productivity and on the wage premium of non-family workers (that is, what the 
firm pays to the worker over and above the reservation wage). Our results suggest that the 
relaxation of credit constraints in itself may not be enough in contributing to small firm 
growth in developing countries. Our paper shows both theoretically and empirically the 
importance of monitoring costs of non-family labour in explaining why few family firms in 
the informal sector make the transition to the use of non-family labour, limiting the growth of 
family owned micro enterprises in the economy. 
From a policy perspective, the findings of the paper suggest that skill training programmes 
that increase the productivity of non-family workers relative to the costs of monitoring them 
would induce entrepreneurs of small informal firms more likely to employ them, and make 
the firm grow. In addition, strengthening of the capabilities of entrepreneurs to run their 
enterprises efficiently (such as financial literacy initiatives) would allow them to spend more 
time on activities that are important for the firm’s growth such as identifying new markets 
and investing in technology as well as able to monitor the workers that they employ from 
outside.     
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics 
 
Variable 
No of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
HIRED 
WORKERS 
12614 1.3097 0.8917 0 5.9965 
LOAN 12614 10.5790 1.8417 3.4693 18.3303 
INVPROD 12614 0.15828 1.07874 0.00004 106.66670 
WAGEPREM 12611 0.0098 0.0123 0 0.4852 
DAYSBUS 12614 34.0752 3.4781 30 41 
TAXRATE 12614 68.7481 1.0577 66.5 70.3 
LABREG 12614 0.5745 0.2561 0 0.8571 
LABPRDDIF 12614 13.9572 14.4192 6.6431 127.8028 
ACMAINT 12614 0.2745 0.4463 0 1 
OWNERSHIP 12614 0.1701 0.3758 0 1 
LOCATION 12614 0.7653 0.4238 0 1 
NATOP 12614 0.9337 0.2488 0 1 
LINKAGE 12614 0.2332 0.4229 0 1 
REGIS 12614 0.6819 0.4658 0 1 
PRIMEDU 11248 0.1596 0.0350 0.0599 0.8752 
MIDGRADEDU 11248 0.2694 0.1050 0.0723 0.9646 
BORRCN 12611 0.5467 0.4978 0 1 
BKCRDT 11248 7.3036 1.0472 5.2388 11.4857 
SIZE 12614 1.7624 0.6734 0 6.0064 
Note: All financial variables, HIRED WORKERS and SIZE are in natural logarithms. All financial variables are 
in real terms. 
Source: Authors’ estimates.  
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Table 2 
Regression Results 
Dependent Variable = Log of Hired Labour 
Variables OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LOAN 0.2528*** 
(0. 0036) 
0.2635*** 
(.0048) 
0.2668*** 
(0.0054) 
0.2468*** 
(0.0048) 
0.1991*** 
(0.0057) 
0.2036*** 
(0.0061) 
0.3079*** 
(0.0506) 
0.3517*** 
(0.0564) 
INVPROD 0. 1792*** 
(0.0691) 
 
0.2631*** 
(0.0658) 
0.2755*** 
(0.0688) 
0.1950*** 
(0.0632) 
0.2055*** 
(0.0631) 
0.7158** 
(0.3096) 
0.9204*** 
(0.3762) 
LOAN*INVPROD -0-.0215*** 
(0.0072) 
 
-0.0301*** 
(0.0069) 
-0.0314*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.0224*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0233*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0772** 
(0.0330) 
-0.0989*** 
(0.0402) 
WAGEPREM 
 
18.0548*** 
(3.8781) 
18.3529*** 
(4.2161) 
11.1178*** 
(3.6820) 
7.9310** 
(3.9118) 
10.8904*** 
(4.1486) 
35.0097** 
(14.9621) 
44.5174*** 
(17.7107) 
LOAN*WAGEPREM 
 
-1.4425*** 
(0.3283) 
-1.4886*** 
(0.3620) 
-0.9219*** 
(0.2887) 
-0.7798** 
(0.3199) 
-0.9796*** 
(0.3427) 
-3.0450** 
(1.3150) 
-3.8692*** 
(1.5727) 
Constant -1.3612*** 
(0.0393) 
-1.4958*** 
(0.0506) 
-1.5250*** 
(0.0569) 
-1.4692*** 
(0.0545) 
-2.5929*** 
(0.4629) 
-2.1874*** 
(0.5329) 
-3.1013*** 
(0.7715) 
-3.8621*** 
(0.8276) 
Controls 
Industry Dummy N N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Dummy N N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Costs and Benefits of 
Formalisation 
N N N N Y Y Y 
Y 
Production 
Technology/Ability of 
Entrepreneur 
N N N N Y Y Y 
Y 
District Specific Controls N N N N N Y N Y 
N 12614 12611 12611 12611 12611 11245 11243 11243 
R squared  0.2710 0.2722 0.2733 0.3551 0.3957 0.4005 - - 
F/chi Test 1778.93 1824.04 1099.95 268.11 233.00 203.75 148.95 135.71 
Presence of Endogeneity (Durbin-Wu-Hausman test)  
chi2 
      4.46944 
(0.0345) 
7.37071 
(0.0066) 
F 
      4.46457 
(0.0346) 
7.34725 
(0.0067) 
Coefficient Value of Instrument  
BORRCN       -0.1855*** 
(0.0299) 
-0.1848*** 
(0.0302) 
BKCRDT       0.1211*** 
(0.0143) 
0.1314*** 
(0.0180) 
Tests for Validity of the Instrument  
Underidentification test: 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic 
(Chi2 P-value) 
      
133.462 
(0.000) 
111.850 
(0.000) 
Weak identification test:  
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald 
F statistic 
      
67.787 57.944 
Hansen J Statistic 
(overidentification of all 
instruments)  
(Chi2 P-value) 
      
1.471 
(0.2252) 
0.421 
(0.5165) 
Notes: (a) *** and ** stand for significant at 1 per cent and 5 per cent level or more; (b)  N=No, Y=Yes. 
(c) We have also estimated the model with only BORRCN as an instrument. Our findings did not change, 
indicating the robustness of the results to different specifications.  
See Table 4 in Appendix II for the full version of the table with all coefficients. 
Source: Authors’ estimates.  
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Table 3 
Auxiliary Regressions: OLS and IV estimates 
Dependent Variable = Log of Hired Labour 
Variables 
OLS Results IV Results 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
LOAN 0. 0503*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0579*** 
(0.0037) 
0.3345*** 
(0.0671) 
0.9048*** 
(0.2610) 
SIZE 1.2986*** 
(0.0193) 
1.3752*** 
(0.0199) 
2.6382*** 
(0.3190) 
5.2495*** 
(1.2006) 
LOAN*SIZE -0.0090*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0149*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.1392*** 
(0.0309) 
-0.3890*** 
(0.1160) 
Constant -1.3391*** 
(0.0348) 
-1.5114*** 
(0.0399) 
-4.2037*** 
(0.6768) 
-10.2621*** 
(2.6908) 
Industry dummy  N Y N Y 
Year dummy N Y N Y 
State dummy N Y N Y 
N 12614 12614 11245 11245 
R squared 0.89 0.90 - - 
F/chi Test 43282.04 3729.04 14825.15 309.14 
Presence of Endogeneity (Durbin-Wu-Hausman test) 
chi2   
136.599  
(0.000) 
64.705 
(0.000) 
F   
142.333  
(0.000) 
65.575  
(0.000) 
Coefficient Value of Instrument 
BORRCN 
  
-0.0572*** 
(0.0117) 
-0.0423*** 
(0.0117) 
BKCRDT 
  
0.0512*** 
(0.0068) 
0.0078 
(0.0081) 
Tests for Validity of the Instrument 
Underidentification 
test: 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM statistic 
(Chi2 P-value) 
  
58.460  
(0.000) 
13.614  
(0.0011) 
Weak 
identification test:  
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F statistic 
  29.483 6.792 
Hansen J Statistic 
(overidentification of 
all instruments)  
(Chi2 P-value) 
  
5.139  
(0.0234) 
0.335  
(0.5629) 
Notes: (a) *** and ** stand for significant at 1 per cent and 5 per cent level or more; (b)  N=No, Y=Yes. 
             Source: Authors’ estimates.  
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Figure 1: The Possible Non-Monotonicity in the Relationship between Demand for 
Outside Labour (n) and Access to Loans (L) 
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APPENDIX I 
 
In this Appendix, we explore two further extensions of the model that we present in the 
paper. Firstly, we examine the implications of higher ability of the entrepreneur on the use of 
hired labour. Secondly, we relax the assumption that hiring family labour has no costs, by 
introducing training costs for family labour. 
Extension 1: Higher Ability of Entrepreneurs 
Let us represent θ to measure ability which affects the probability of success and  𝑝/(θ) > 0. 
Then we have the following proposition:  
Proposition 3: The abler the entrepreneur, the lower the costs of monitoring and the 
larger is the labour hired by the firm.   
Proof: Differentiating the first order condition (7), we get: 
   
𝜕𝜆
𝜕θ
=
𝑝/(θ)𝑓/(n)n
(𝑤−𝑤)̅̅ ̅̅
𝑤
𝑞/
𝑞
𝜋𝜆𝜆
< 0 and 
And using the above result in the equilibrium number if labour employed by the firm , we 
get:  
𝜕𝑛
𝜕θ
= −
  −
𝑐
𝑞
𝑞/
𝑞
[
𝑐
𝑞(𝜇)
+?̅?]
2 
∂λ
∂θ
>0. That is, firms and managed by entrepreneurs of higher ability will 
employ higher hired labour. 
Extension 2: Training Costs of Family Labour  
Consider the firm’s expected profits function, when we explicitly introduce family labour in 
the firm’s production function:  
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𝜋 = 𝑝(𝜆)[𝑓(𝑛) − 𝐿(1 + 𝑟)] − 𝐹     
where  𝑛 = 𝛽𝑛ℎ + 𝑛0 and 𝑛ℎ = nunber of fixed household labourer , 𝛽 > 1 is the relative 
productivity level between home and outside workers which depends on training of hours 
chosen endogenously by the household and  𝑛0 =  hired labourers from the outside market.  
Let the training cost be  𝐶(𝛽𝑛ℎ)  and     𝐶/(𝛽𝑛ℎ) > 0  and 𝐶//(𝛽𝑛ℎ) ≥ 0 . The higher level 
of skill acquisition involves larger training costs. The total budget need to be accommodated 
between training the household labours and hiring outside workers with a fixed skill level 
normalized to unity. 
Where, 𝑛0 =
L+a−𝐶(𝛽𝑛ℎ)
w
=   
𝐿+𝑎−𝐶(𝛽𝑛ℎ)
𝑐
𝑞(µ)
+?̅?
 
Hence,  max
{𝜆,𝛽}
𝜋 = 𝑝(𝜆) [𝑓 (𝛽𝑛ℎ +
𝐿+𝑎−𝐶(𝛽𝑛ℎ)
𝑐
𝑞(𝜇)
+ ?̅?
) − 𝐿(1 + 𝑟)] – 𝐹                    
First order conditions are: 
𝜆:    𝑝/ (λ)[f(n) − R] =  p𝑓/(n)𝑛0
(𝑤−𝑤)̅̅ ̅̅
𝑤
𝑞/
𝑞
         
𝛽 :    𝐶/(𝛽𝑛ℎ) = 𝑤 =
c
q(µ)
+ ?̅?                                          
The optimal level of training (𝛽)and 𝜆 = 1 −  μ are determined jointly by these two 
equations. The first equation is identical to equation (7) in the paper. The interpretation of the 
second equation is that at the optimum the marginal costs of inside training must be equal to 
marginal cost of hiring outside workers, which is, 𝑤. 
We can obtain the following two implications, when we include training costs for family 
labour: 
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Implication1:  More training leads to a less number of hired workers if family and non-
family workers are substitutes. Therefore, a firm with more skilled family workers will 
tend to hire lesser outside (non-family) workers. 
Implication 2: The higher level of market wage increases the opportunity costs of hiring 
workers from outside and the household will devote more time in training.  
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APPENDIX II 
 
Table 4 
Regression Results 
Dependent Variable = Log of Hired Labour 
Variables OLS IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LOAN 0.2528*** 
(0. 0036) 
0.2635*** 
(.0048) 
0.2668*** 
(0.0054) 
0.2468*** 
(0.0048) 
0.1991*** 
(0.0057) 
0.2036*** 
(0.0061) 
0.3079*** 
(0.0506) 
0.3517*** 
(0.0564) 
INVPROD 0. 1792*** 
(0.0691) 
 
0.2631*** 
(0.0658) 
0.2755*** 
(0.0688) 
0.1950*** 
(0.0632) 
0.2055*** 
(0.0631) 
0.7158** 
(0.3096) 
0.9204*** 
(0.3762) 
LOAN*INVPROD -0-.0215*** 
(0.0072) 
 
-0.0301*** 
(0.0069) 
-0.0314*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.0224*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0233*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0772** 
(0.0330) 
-0.0989*** 
(0.0402) 
WAGEPREM 
 
18.0548*** 
(3.8781) 
18.3529*** 
(4.2161) 
11.1178*** 
(3.6820) 
7.9310** 
(3.9118) 
10.8904*** 
(4.1486) 
35.0097** 
(14.9621) 
44.5174*** 
(17.7107) 
LOAN*WAGEPREM 
 
-1.4425*** 
(0.3283) 
-1.4886*** 
(0.3620) 
-0.9219*** 
(0.2887) 
-0.7798** 
(0.3199) 
-0.9796*** 
(0.3427) 
-3.0450** 
(1.3150) 
-3.8692*** 
(1.5727) 
Constant -1.3612*** 
(0.0393) 
-1.4958*** 
(0.0506) 
-1.5250*** 
(0.0569) 
-1.4692*** 
(0.0545) 
-2.5929*** 
(0.4629) 
-2.1874*** 
(0.5329) 
-3.1013*** 
(0.7715) 
-3.8621*** 
(0.8276) 
Controls 
Industry Dummy N N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Dummy N N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Costs and Benefits of Formalisation 
DAYSBUS 
N N N N 
0.0010 
(0.0020) 
0.0038 
(0.0024) 
0.0073*** 
(0.0029)      
0.0105***    
(0.0036)      
TAXRATE 
N N N N 
0.0252*** 
(0.0070) 
0.0192   
(0.0083)    
0.0154**   
(0.0077)     
0.0206**   
(0.0085)      
LABREG 
N N N N 
0.0260 
(0.0264) 
0.0047  
(0.0276)      
-0.0479   
(0.0340)     
-0.0497   
(0.0353)     
LABPRDDIF 
N N N N 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.0002   
(0.0007)      
0.0007   
(0.0006)      
0.0002   
(0.0007) 
Production Technology/Ability of Entrepreneur 
ACMAINT 
N N N N 
0.1923*** 
(0.0170) 
0.1984***   
(0.0181)    
0.1080**   
(0.0485)     
0.0663   
(0.0538)     
OWNERSHIP 
N N N N 
0.2556*** 
(0.0185) 
0.2714***   
(0.0193)     
0.2162***    
(0.0333)      
0.1941***   
(0.0366)      
LOCATION 
N N N N 
0.0838*** 
(0.0170) 
0.1003***  
(0.0181)     
0.0683***   
(0.0232)      
0.0577**   
(0.0243)      
NATOP 
N N N N 
-0.4685*** 
(0.0328) 
-0.5112***    
(0.0349)    
-0.5246***   
(0.0368)    
-0.5344***   
(0.0374)    
LINKAGE 
N N N N 
0.0667*** 
(0.0159) 
0.0687***   
(0.0168)     
0.0864***   
(0.0193)      
0.0937***   
(0.0202)      
REGIS 
N N N N 
0.1515*** 
(0.0163) 
0.1255***  
(0.0174)     
0.0403   
(0.0438)     
0.0089    
(0.0474)     
District Specific Controls 
PRIMEDU 
N N N N N 
-0.5035* 
(0.2883)     
N 
-0.5112*   
(0.2970)     
MIDGRADEDU 
N N N N N 
-0.0202 
(0.0880)     
N 
-0.1960**   
(0.1000)     
N 12614 12611 12611 12611 12611 11245 11243 11243 
R squared  0.2710 0.2722 0.2733 0.3551 0.3957 0.4005 - - 
F/chi Test 1778.93 1824.04 1099.95 268.11 233.00 203.75 148.95 135.71 
Presence of Endogeneity (Durbin-Wu-Hausman test)  
chi2 
      4.46944 
(0.0345) 
7.37071 
(0.0066) 
F 
      4.46457 
(0.0346) 
7.34725 
(0.0067) 
Coefficient Value of Instrument  
BORRCN       -0.1855*** 
(0.0299) 
-0.1848*** 
(0.0302) 
BKCRDT       0.1211*** 
(0.0143) 
0.1314*** 
(0.0180) 
Tests for Validity of the Instrument  
Underidentification       133.462 111.850 
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test: 
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM statistic 
(Chi2 P-value) 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Weak identification 
test:  
Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F statistic 
      
67.787 57.944 
Hansen J Statistic 
(overidentification of 
all instruments)  
(Chi2 P-value) 
      
1.471 
(0.2252) 
0.421 
(0.5165) 
Notes: (a) *** and ** stand for significant at 1 per cent and 5 per cent level or more; (b)  N=No, Y=Yes. 
Source: Authors’ estimates.  
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Notes: 
                                                          
1 The role that firms in the informal sector play in job creation among poor unskilled workers has been 
increasingly recognised in the policy literature – see Naudé (2010) and World Bank (2013).  
2 It should be noted that the empirical evidence on whether financial development has a strong positive effect on 
entrepreneurial activity is fairly limited. Among the few studies that have studied the effect of financial 
development on entrepreneurship, Paulson and Townsend (2004) find that liquidity constraints play an 
important role in determining who becomes an entrepreneur, using data from rural Thailand. In the case of 
Africa, Baliamoune-Lutz et al (2011) find that policies aimed at easing the binding credit constraints would 
stimulate productive entrepreneurship and private sector employment. For India, Bell and Rousseau (2001) find 
a positive relationship between financial development and industrialisation using time-series data from 1950 to 
1990 but do not directly study the effect of financial development on entrepreneurial activity.  
3Such as the management of product innovation and the development of marketing skills that enhance the 
probability of success of the investment project. 
4 Several empirical studies have found the problem of shirking among workers an important problem for 
managers of firms, especially in the context of developing country labour markets where labour contracts are 
difficult to enforce. These studies have also found that efficiency wages increase with firm size, as monitoring 
costs increase (Ewing and Payne 1999; Fafchamps and Soderbom 2006). 
5 In our model, we do not consider the opportunity cost of family labour, which would be the wage foregone in 
the labour market, as a full treatment of the endogenous occupational choice of the self-employed would take us 
from our current focus, which is the size of the family firm. See Kanbur (1979) and Banerjee and Newman 
(1993) among others, which have discussed an individual’s choice to become entrepreneur or a worker in the 
context of financial market imperfections. 
6 Our results will not change if we allow monitoring costs for both family and non-family labour, as long as the 
monitoring costs of non-family labour are higher. 
7 If we use the production function  𝑌 = 𝐴𝑛𝛼   the average productivity of labour (AP)  is  
𝑌
𝑛
= 𝐴𝑛𝛼−1 and the 
marginal productivity of labour (MP) is  
𝑑𝑌
𝑑𝑛
= 𝛼𝐴𝑛𝛼−1. Hence,  AP = 𝛼𝑀𝑃 and we can use AP as a proxy for 
MP for empirical purposes .   
8 We restrict our sample to the fifteen major Indian states, where over 90 per cent of firms in our data-set are 
located. 
9 As an illustration of the differences on the costs of formalisation across Indian states, it takes 31 days to start a 
business in Rajasthan and 41 days in Kerala. We obtain the data on DAYSBUS and TAXRATE from the World 
Bank (2009).  
10 The national level Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) been extensively amended by state governments during the 
post-independence period. Besley and Burgess  (2004) code each state amendment to labour laws as neutral, 
pro-worker or pro-employer. For neutral amendments, they assign a score of zero, for a pro-worker amendment 
a score of +1 and for a pro-employer amendment a score of -1. They then cumulate the scores over time for the 
period 1947-1997. In their sample, the state of West Bengal has the most pro-worker labour institutions with a 
score of +4 in 1997, and Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu the most pro-employer labour institutions, each with a 
score of -2 in 1997. We use the Besley-Burgess measure for the last year for which the measure has been 
calculated – that is, 1997. 
11 Note that the registration with acts/authorities of the state and municipal governments is not the same as 
registering with the official agency under the Factories Act (that is, when the firm becomes a formal entity). 
State and municipal governments and cooperative authorities provide bespoke support to informal firms (or 
certain categories of them, such as enterprises making traditional crafts and handicrafts) in their jurisdiction or 
41 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
require them to pay fees or limited insurance benefits to their employees, for which these firms need to register 
under the relevant act/authority.  
12 We use National Industries Classification (NIC) three digit industry dummies in our regressions. 
13 Indian banks have to follow mandatory directed credit lending programmes set by the Reserve Bank of India 
where about forty per cent of their credit allocation has to go to the so-called priority sector, which includes 
agriculturalists and small manufacturing firms. Given these mandatory lending requirements, bank credit to the 
informal sector (as well as to other “priority” sectors) is supply-determined to a large extent.   
14 Our model predicts that the number of non-family workers a firm will hire will depend on a) credit constraints 
which prevent it from borrowing to pay the outside workers’ wages, and b) the returns to hiring an additional 
outside worker as compared to the higher wage premium to be paid for monitoring. Firms may either be 
constrained and remain small due to difficulty in accessing external finance and/or may choose to remain small 
if the returns to increase in size is not justified due to higher  monitoring costs. The low number of hired 
workers (less than four) that an average informal firm in India employs may suggest that these firms face quite 
severe credit constraints and/or the returns to increasing firm size for an average informal firm in India may not 
be large enough to justify the higher wage premium to be paid to hired workers as firm size increases.  
 
15 We have also re-estimated the regressions, using only BORRCN as the instrument, since it can be argued that 
BKCRDT may not meet the exclusion restriction if greater financial development leads to the growth of 
informal firms. We do not find any change in our IV results when we use BORRCN as the only instrument.     
16 Results are not presented but available from authors on request.  
17 We define firm size as the number of total workers, which include both non-family and family workers. 
